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Introduction
general principles of law are frequently ranked among the most controversial 
categories of international law. nearly each and every important parameter of 
these principles has induced prolonged and intense academic debates ever since 
the advisory committee of distinguished jurists entrusted with the preparation of 
a report on the statute of the Permanent court of international Justice decided 
nine decades ago to include ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’ in the catalogue of sources that would be applied by the future judicial 
organ.1 in the spirit of expediency and positive experiences, a quarter-century later 
the drafters of the statute of the international court of Justice took over from the 
preceding document the provision on applicable sources in an identical shape, save 
for a minor specifying addendum.2 nevertheless, it remains a matter of debate 
whether general principles of law form part of positive law or natural law, originate 
from domestic law or international law, carry a distinctively private law or public 
law content, possess a subsidiary or supreme character, qualify as an independent 
source of international law, and occupy a separate, if any, position in the 
international legal order. Finally, the methods and conditions of their international 
applicability likewise yield much disagreement in the scholarly community.3
this chapter merely seeks to examine whether general principles of law 
constitute a source of international law, and by what legislative means they 
might achieve that status. the following investigation is based on the assumption 
that general principles – this complex set of private and public, substantive and 
procedural rules, such as the principle of equity, the prohibition of abuse of rights, 
the prohibition of unjust enrichment, the protection of acquired rights, the principle 
of reparation, res iudicata, audiatur et altera pars or pacta sunt servanda – belong 
to the domain of positive law and originate from domestic law. hence these rules 
should not be deemed equivalent to the so-called ‘principles of international law’, 
1 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Article 38, paragraph 3.
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c).
3 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law, as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals. Reprint (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 1994), 2–5.
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Rethinking International Law and Justice314
such as the sovereign equality of states, the prohibition of threat or use of force, 
the prohibition of intervention, the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
and the right to self-determination of peoples. nor should they be seen as totally 
synonymous with the ‘general principles of international law’, ‘principles of 
international organizations’, ‘principles of transnational law’ and ‘principles of 
supranational law’. though these latter categories may occasionally overlap with 
general principles of law, it is but a terminological anomaly that does not have 
any significance here.4
international lawyers have been divided over the questions in the focus of our 
investigation from the outset. the negative position typically holds that general 
principles originating from domestic law cannot be categorized as a source of 
international law, as they were not created by the concurrent wills of two or more 
states to govern their international relations. their international application is 
based on a special rule of customary law that authorizes international judicial 
organs, with a view to avoid non liquet, to resort, by way of analogy, to principles 
borrowed from the technically more advanced national legal systems in the 
settlement of disputes, where gaps in the system of international law would 
otherwise render a decision impossible. That rule of authorization was codified 
in article 38, paragraph 3, of the statute of the Permanent court of international 
Justice and article 38, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c) of the statute of the 
international court of Justice.5
incontestably, the abstract and general principles at issue spring from the 
legislative will of a single state, derive from a multitude of specific interconnected 
legal norms, permeate the entirety or segments of the legal system, and are meant 
to regulate domestic social relations, and to provide guidelines for national law-
making and law enforcement. these features obviously do not match those of the 
sources of international law. however, it would lead to premature and tenuous 
results, if we ceased our investigation here, relying on a brief and superficial 
analysis of the problem. in order to answer the question concerning their nature 
as a source of international law, we must disregard the peculiar formation and 
characteristics of general principles. instead, it should be thoroughly examined 
whether there has been any legislative act in the international level after the 
domestic consolidation of these principles, which made them an independent 
source of international law.
4 For more details, see, G. Sulyok, ‘General Principles of Law as a Source of 
international law’, in International Law – A Quiet Strength (Miscellanea in memoriam 
Géza Herczegh), ed. P. kovács (Budapest: Pázmány Press, 2011), 166–68.
5 G. Herczegh, General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order 
(Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969), 97–100. See also, H. Bokor-Szegő, ‘Les principes 
généraux du droit’, in Droit international: bilan et perspectives, vol. 1, ed. M. Bedjaoui 
(Paris: a. Pedone – unesco, 1991), 228–29; h. kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: 
A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, with Supplement (london: stevens & 
sons ltd, 1951), 533.
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Reception of General Principles of Law
erstwhile literature suggests that the necessity to apply domestic legal rules, as a 
separate source of law, to the international conduct of states had already surfaced 
in the period of traditional international law. in the nineteenth century these rules 
had been supplied by internationally relevant municipal laws and regulations of 
selected states,6 but at the beginning of the twentieth century their place was taken 
over, for various theoretical and practical reasons, by ‘the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations’.7 thus the development of international law has 
and does not terminate the need for assistance by the technically more advanced 
national legal systems. the explanation lies in the paradoxical effects of progress: 
while the growth of conventional and customary law decreases the number of gaps 
and the value of domestic legal solutions, the expansion of legal regulation to new 
fields generates new gaps, and maintains the demand for provisions originating 
from domestic law.
if the picture canvassed by scholars of traditional international law broadly 
corresponds to past realities, the elevation of certain rules of national legal 
systems, including general principles of law, to the international level primarily 
served to more comprehensively govern the international conduct of states in 
fields inadequately regulated by other sources of law rather than to facilitate the 
settlement of disputes submitted to international judicial organs by the prevention of 
6 See, for example, J.C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten 
als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (Nördlingen: C.H. Beck’schen, 1868), 58–59; C. Calvo, Le 
droit international théorique et pratique, précédé d’un exposé historique des progrès de la 
science du droit des gens, 4th edn, vol. 1 (Paris – Berlin: guillaumin et cie – Puttkammer et 
Mühlbrecht, 1887), 161–62; P. Fiore, Nouveau droit international public, suivant les besoins 
de la civilisation moderne, 2nd edn, vol. 1 (Paris: g. Pedone-lauriel, 1885), 158–59; F. 
von holzendorff and a. Rivier, Introduction au droit des gens: recherches philosophiques, 
historiques et bibliographiques (hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und druckerei ag, 1889), 83; 
t.J. lawrence, The Principles of International Law (Boston: d.c. heath and co, 1895), 
105–06; F.F. Martens, Traité de droit international (Paris: a. chevalier-Marescq, 1883), 
252–53; P.l.e. Pradier-Fodéré, Traité de droit international public européen & américain, 
suivant les progrès de la science et de la pratique contemporaines, vol. 1 (Paris: g. Pedone-
lauriel, 1885), 88–89; h. wheaton, Elements of International Law, with a Sketch of the 
History of the Science (Philadelphia: carey, lea and Blanchard, 1836), 49.
7 See, for example, E.M. Borchard, ‘The Theory and Sources of International Law’, 
in Recueil d’études sur les sources du droit en l’honneur de François Gény, vol. 3 (Paris: 
sirey, 1934), 354–56; l. le Fur, ‘la coutume et les principes généraux du droit comme 
sources du droit international public’, ibid., 366–72; a. Verdross, ‘les principes généraux 
du droit comme source du droit des gens’, ibid., 383–86; c. de Visscher, ‘contribution à 
l’étude des sources du droit international’, ibid., 395–98. see also, h. lauterpacht, Private 
Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, with Special Reference to International 
Arbitration (london: longmans, green, and co, 1927), 69–71; J.B. scott, ed., The 
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1907, vol. 1 (new york: 
oxford university Press, 1920), 351.
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Rethinking International Law and Justice316
non liquet.8 that presupposes international law-making, even if its exact course and 
date can hardly be ascertained from the distance of approximately one and a half 
centuries. Its occurrence is confirmed by its results only: the disturbingly chaotic 
literary reflections and the vague remarks made by international judicial organs.
However, it causes little difficulty to outline the hypothesis of a law-making 
process culminating in the international recognition of general principles of law. 
this process is arguably based on an automatism, the beginning of which is 
marked by the emergence of a customary rule of reception. accordingly, states 
accept, without exhaustive enumeration or further measures, principles originating 
from domestic law as an integral part and unwritten source of international law, 
if they are generally recognized and suitable to govern international relations. 
Following the emergence of the rule of reception, the incorporation of general 
principles takes place automatically, provided that the two conjunctive conditions 
are met. The fulfilment of these conditions is continuously ‘verified’ by the rule of 
reception, as it will be displayed later with regard to the question of termination. 
(it may be inferred by exclusion of other possibilities that the rule of reception 
forms part of universal customary law. simply put, it could not have come into 
existence in any other way.9)
the requirement of general recognition does not imply that a principle has 
to exist in the domestic law of every state in the world. notwithstanding that the 
reference to ‘civilized nations’ in the statute of the international court of Justice 
is utterly obsolete and rightly criticized,10 it seems sufficient, if the dominant legal 
systems of principal families of law accept a provision with identical or similar 
content.11 notably, this allegation may prove implausible for extreme positivists, 
who have been reluctant to regard general principles of law as a source of law, unless 
they are recognized by every state, claiming ‘those are the rules of international 
8 ‘The general principles of law, therefore, permanently rectify a more primitive law 
in the spirit of a more advanced and progressive law.’ J. csiky, Az általános jogelvek, mint 
a nemzetközi jog forrása [General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law] 
(Szeged: Szeged Városi Nyomda és Könyvkiadó, 1934), 43. (Emphasis omitted.)
9 In the past, a less-known scholar also traced back the legal nature of general 
principles of law to customary law, but he did not hypothesize the existence of a rule of 
reception. instead, he suggested that customary law behaved as ‘a source of law, which 
designates another source of law’. csiky, Az általános jogelvek, mint a nemzetközi jog 
forrása [General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law], 21–22.
10 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark) 
(Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, icJ Reports 
1969, separate opinion of Judge Fouad ammoun, 132–34. cf. Reparation for injuries 
suffered in the service of the united nations, advisory opinion of 11 april 1949, icJ 
Reports 1949, dissenting opinion by Judge krylov, 219.
11 Distant similarities can be revealed in this respect between general principles 
of law and ancient Roman ius gentium. gaius, Institutionum commentarii quattuor, i.1; 
Digest, 1.1.9.
Sampford Book 1.indb   316 9/24/2014   3:52:56 PM
Pr
oo
f C
op
y 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
General Principles of Law and International Law-Making 317
law only, to which states in some way consent’.12 yet such an interpretation of 
general recognition is dubious, as it looks for the intentions of states in the wrong 
place, and erroneously confounds their domestic and international legislative 
wills. the international legislative will that manifests itself in the rule of reception 
and elevates general principles to the international level is not an aggregate or 
a reflection of domestic legislative wills that originally establish the principles 
concerned. these wills prevail in different realms, pursue different objectives, 
and carry different contents. hence the internationally relevant manifestation of 
legislative intention and engagement should be sought not in domestic law, but in 
the rule of reception, which does not demand recognition by every state for the 
elevation of a principle to the international level. indications are that it is enough, 
if the dominant legal systems of principal families of law accept it with identical 
or similar content. The verification of general recognition calls for the application 
of the comparative method,13 but in the procedure of the international court of 
Justice, a consensus among judges representing the main forms of civilization and 
the principal legal systems of the world might as well suffice.14
the requirement of suitability to govern international relations must likewise 
be interpreted in a flexible manner. This condition merely implies that a domestic 
provision, which is to be reckoned as a general principle, must be capable of 
producing effects on the international plane in view of the similarities between 
the typical behaviour of private persons and states. once these conditions are met, 
a principle is elevated to the international level, albeit its content is at this point 
12 Csiky, Az általános jogelvek, mint a nemzetközi jog forrása [General Principles of 
Law as a Source of International Law], 15. (emphasis omitted.)
13 It has been submitted that this process consists of two operations. The vertical 
move involves the abstraction of legal principles from domestic rules; the horizontal move 
involves the verification of general recognition of principles thus obtained. F.O. Raimondo, 
General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
(leiden – Boston: Martinus nijhoff, 2008), 45 et seq. the process has also been described 
as a threefold test comprising the verification of general character, recognition by civilized 
nations and capability of being incorporated into international law. M. Bos, A Methodology 
of International Law (amsterdam – new york – oxford: north-holland, 1984), 262. see 
also, M.c. Bassiouni, ‘a Functional approach to “general Principles of international law”’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law 11, no. 3 (1990): 809–16; B. conforti, International 
Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (dordrecht: Martinus nijhoff, 1993), 64–65. it 
is essential to prevent imbalances caused by the dominance of world languages, especially 
english and French, in the course of the process. c. tomuschat, ‘international law: 
ensuring the survival of Mankind on the eve of a new century. general course on Public 
international law’, Recueil des Cours vol. 281 (1999): 339.
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 9. Cf. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Preliminary objection, Judgment of 22 July 1952, icJ 
Reports 1952, dissenting opinion of Judge levi carneiro, 161.
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Rethinking International Law and Justice318
still extremely abstract and raw. it is primarily the task of the judiciary to disclose, 
specify and elaborate on that content.15
even though the process under deliberation rests on a rule of customary law, 
it does not yield as an outcome new customary norms, for it is not a convergence 
of general practice and opinio iuris of states that creates the domestic provisions 
elevated to the international level. in fact, states endeavoured by the establishment 
of the rule of reception to fill the gaps of conventional and customary law by 
generally recognized domestic principles capable of governing international 
relations. Consequently, on account of its gap-filling function and the differences of 
various law-making processes, the rule of reception incorporates general principles 
of law into the system of international law as an independent source of law rather 
than as customary law. this surely does not preclude a subsequent conventional 
or customary reaffirmation of certain principles,16 but it will affect neither their 
nature as general principles of law nor the independence of this unique source of 
law. similar intertwinements regularly occur between conventional and customary 
international law without any bearing on their respective self-identities.17
due to the exceptionally high degree of abstraction of general principles, their 
effects can barely be perceived in everyday life: upon the examination of the 
conduct of members of the international community, we much earlier and more 
15 Cf. ‘International law has recruited and continues to recruit many of its rules 
and institutions from private systems of law. […] the way in which international law 
borrows from this source is not by means of importing private law institutions “lock, stock 
and barrel”, ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be difficult to 
reconcile such a process with the application of “the general principles of law”. in my 
opinion, the true view of the duty of international tribunals in this matter is to regard any 
features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law 
as an indication of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and 
institutions’. International Status of South-West Africa, advisory opinion of 11 July 1950, 
icJ Reports 1950, separate opinion by sir arnold Mcnair, 148.
16 G. Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’, in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. 4, ed. R. wolfrum (oxford: oxford university Press, 2012), 375. 
it is often regarded as a fundamental function of general principles of law to facilitate 
the development of international law. cheng, General Principles of Law, as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, 39; herczegh, General Principles of Law and the 
International Legal Order, 116; P. kovács, A nemzetközi jog fejlesztésének lehetőségei 
és korlátai a nemzetközi bíróságok joggyakorlatában [The Perspectives and Obstacles of 
the Development of International Law in the Practice of International Courts] (Budapest: 
Pázmány Péter katolikus egyetem Jog- és Államtudományi kar, 2010), 85–88; Raimondo, 
General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 
50. see also, M. Bartoš, ‘transformation des principes généraux en règles positives du 
droit international’, in Mélanges offerts à Juraj Andrassy, ed. V. ibler (la haye: Martinus 
nijhoff, 1968), 1–12; w. Friedmann, ‘the uses of “general Principles” in the development 
of international law’, American Journal of International Law 57, no. 2 (1963): 279–99.
17 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, icJ Reports 1986, 93–96.
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General Principles of Law and International Law-Making 319
easily come across a relevant conventional or customary norm, than a general 
principle of law, as the former relates to the latter as lex specialis relates to lex 
generalis. therefore, these provisions mostly surface in judicial proceedings, when 
judges encounter gaps in the law during the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. it is no coincidence that the literature of general principles of law focuses 
on the practice of international judicial organs, as their existence, contents and 
effects are best observable in that field. Otherwise, these provisions are not a 
particularly effective source of international law.18
it should be added that the customary rule of reception is not identical to the 
rule of authorization, as codified in Article 38, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the 
Permanent court of international Justice and article 38, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 
c) of the statute of the international court of Justice, which permits international 
judicial organs to resort to general principles of law by way of analogy. the rule of 
reception precedes the rule of authorization in terms of both the time of formation 
and the logic of functioning. that leads to two further conclusions. First, the rule of 
authorization sanctions the application of international law rather than domestic law. 
second, it was not the cited statutes that established the general principles of law – 
these documents only rendered them applicable in the procedure of the two courts.
let us recall at this point a remark made by the Permanent court of international 
Justice that portrayed municipal laws as mere facts from the standpoint of 
international law.19 if we project this statement to article 38, paragraph 3, of 
the statute of that court, it becomes evident that ‘the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations’, considered by several prominent drafters of the 
document as provisions originating from national legal systems, could be important 
for the judicial settlement of international disputes insofar as they were applied in 
their international rather than domestic legal capacity. article 38, paragraph 1, of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice explicitly confirms this assessment 
by virtue of the sole amendment to the text of the former provision, as a result 
of which the sentence introducing the catalogue of applicable sources, including 
general principles of law, now reads as follows: ‘the court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply […].’20 (It reaffirms the disparity of the rule of reception and the rule 
of authorization, as well.)
The significance of the highlighted reference to international law has at times 
been rejected on the basis that it does not prove that general principles of law truly 
constitute a source of international law.21 this approach obviously contradicts the 
18 G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (deventer: kluwer, 
1983), 146–48.
19 German Interests in Polish Upper Silezia (Germany v Poland), Judgment no. 7, 
25 May 1926, PciJ series a, no. 7, 19.
20 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, paragraph 1. (Emphasis 
added.)
21 Cf. Herczegh, General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order, 18–19.
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Rethinking International Law and Justice320
basic rules of treaty interpretation, and may lead to other misconceptions.22 these 
misconceptions include, for example, the parallel treatment of the application 
of general principles and the choice of law method, claiming that both point 
towards a foreign legal system as seen from the perspective of the forum applying 
the law. this parallel has far-reaching consequences. it amounts to a denial of 
general principles of law as a source of law to regard their application as a special 
manifestation of the choice of law method, for that method does not entail the 
incorporation of foreign legal rules into the law of the forum.23 however, it 
requires little effort to explore the fundamental differences in the respective bases, 
techniques and normative backgrounds of the application of general principles 
and foreign legal rules, and in the contents and characteristics of the provisions 
invoked. therefore, no matter how appealing this parallel may appear, it can be 
challenged along several dimensions, and has to be deemed unsubstantiated.
Finally, we need to counter a negative position, which maintains that, in spite 
of the identical wording, the sub-paragraph of the statute of the international 
court of Justice concerning general principles of law has a meaning different 
from that of the statute of the Permanent court of international Justice due 
to the divergent historical circumstances prevailing at the time of adoption of 
the two documents.24 though historical interpretation is a universally accepted 
supplementary means of interpretation of international treaties,25 the travaux 
préparatoires of the statutes do not support this allegation. nor can a fundamental 
change of circumstances explain the alleged modification of the original content 
of the provision, because the wording, as already mentioned, was deliberately left 
unaltered in light of positive experiences.
Beyond the introductory sentence of article 38, paragraph 1, of the statute 
of the international court of Justice, miscellaneous other pieces of indirect 
evidence too attest that general principles of law constitute an independent source 
of international law. these pieces of evidence include the law of the european 
union, a legal order distinct from both international law and the national legal 
systems of member states, where the development of law and the strengthening 
of integration necessitated the recognition of general principles of law as a source 
of law. the european court of Justice has played an instrumental role in the 
process. notwithstanding that the founding treaties do not expressly authorize 
the application of general principles, there is widespread agreement that the legal 
basis of this practice can be derived from article 19, paragraph 1, of the treaty 
22 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, Article 31, 
paragraphs 1 and 4.
23 Cf. Herczegh, General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order, 99.
24 G.I. Tunkin, A nemzetközi jog elméletének kérdései [Questions of the Theory of 
International Law] (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1963), 154.
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, Article 32.
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on european union, and articles 263 and 340, paragraph 2, of the treaty on the 
Functioning of the european union.26
the european court of Justice has taken into account the domestic laws of 
member states, the law of the european community, and later the law of the 
european union, and international law, especially the european regime of human 
rights protection, for the determination and application of general principles of law. 
several groups of principles have so crystallized, but a consensus on their exact 
boundaries has not been reached yet. nevertheless, the extensive case law of the 
body indicates that general principles of law that have been incorporated into the 
law of the european union include, for example, the respect for fundamental rights,27 
the prohibition of discrimination,28 the protection of legitimate expectation,29 the 
requirement of effective judicial control,30 the prohibition of retroactive effect,31 ne 
bis in idem32 and pacta sunt servanda.33 the founding treaties, on the other hand, 
scarcely contain explicit references to general principles. such references can be 
found in article 6, paragraph 3, of the treaty on european union, concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights, and article 340, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the treaty 
on the Functioning of the european union, concerning the obligation to make 
good any damage caused by the institutions or their servants in the performance 
of their duties.34
general principles of law undoubtedly rank among the primary sources of 
the law of the european union, and possess a ‘constitutional status’.35 knowing 
that the development of the law of the european union has been greatly inspired 
26 O.J. C 326, 26.10.2012, 27, 162–63, 193.
27 C-29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Sozialamt [1969] ecR 419; c-11/70, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ecR 1125; c-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v 
Commission of the European Communities [1974] ecR 491.
28 C-20/71, Luisa Sabbatini, née Bertoni v European Parliament [1972] ecR 345; 
c-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
[1978] ecR 1365.
29 C-112/77, August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v Commission of the European Communities 
[1978] ecR 1019.
30 C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[1986] ecR 1651.
31 C-63/83, Regina v Kent Kirk [1984] ecR 2689.
32 C-14/68, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ecR 1.
33 C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ecR i-3655.
34 O.J. C 326, 26.10.2012, 19, 193.
35 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, delivered on 30 June 2009, C-101/08, 
Audiolux SA e.a. v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AG 
and Others [2009] ecR i-9823, para. 70. see also, c-101/08, Audiolux SA e.a. v Groupe 
Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AG and Others [2009] ecR 
i-9823, para. 63. For more details, see, t. tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd 
edn (oxford – new york: oxford university Press, 2006).
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Rethinking International Law and Justice322
by international law, the recognition as a source of law of general principles 
partly derived from the national legal systems of member states should not be 
underestimated regardless of the particular circumstances. if this process came 
to pass in a short period of time in the european legal order, it could also have 
easily happened in the considerably older and in many ways standard-setting 
international law. the special features of the law of the european union do not 
undermine the validity of this assumption. thus it seems permissible to draw a 
parallel between international law and the law of the european union as regards 
their attitude towards the general principles of law.
elements of the practice of international organizations and institutions and 
states likewise indirectly prove that general principles of law constitute a source 
of international law. For example, the secretary-general of the united nations 
described them as one of the principal sources of law in an early memorandum on 
the codification of international law.36 the world trade organization has adopted 
a similar approach, and general principles now play an important role in its 
dispute settlement mechanism.37 Furthermore, selected principles originating from 
domestic law have gained special emphasis in international criminal law, where 
different international and hybrid, ad hoc and permanent judicial organs have 
resorted to them on many occasions since the end of world war ii.38 (international 
human rights instruments too tend to recall general principles with respect to 
criminal procedure.39)
national legal systems treat general principles of law as a source of international 
law, as well. it is true that the diverse constitutional clauses on the relationship of 
international law and domestic law typically reaffirm the generally recognized 
principles and/or rules of international law, and omit express references to general 
principles of law, but they are habitually interpreted in a manner so as to embrace 
these principles.40 however, the constitutional clauses on international law are not 
36 Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the 
international law commission: Preparatory work within the Purview of article 18, 
Paragraph 1, of the statute of the international law commission. Memorandum submitted 
by the secretary-general, 10 February 1949, un doc. a/cn.4/1/Rev.1, 22.
37 J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, ‘Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute 
settlement Body’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 2 (2001): 248–98.
38 Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals, 73 et seq. see, for example, united states of america v wilhelm list 
et al., Judgment of 19 February 1948, nürnberg Military tribunal, vol. 11, 1235.
39 See, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 
december 1966, article 15, paragraph 2; convention for the Protection of human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (european convention on human Rights), Rome, 4 november 
1950, article 7, paragraph 2. see also, n.k. hevener and s.a. Mosher, ‘general Principles 
of law and the un covenant on civil and Political Rights’, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1978): 596–613.
40 For a European overview, see, V.S. Vereshchetin, ‘New Constitutions and the 
old Problem of the Relationship between international law and national law’, European 
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the only domestic provisions that need to be taken into account. general principles 
of law also appear in fundamental rights catalogues of constitutions or other laws 
and regulations in connection with the guarantees of criminal procedure, often 
indicating the influence of international human rights instruments.41
Modification and Termination of General Principles of Law
if we accept that general principles of law constitute a source of international law, 
we inevitably face the questions of modification and termination. It has to be stated 
at the outset that modification, in this context, does not designate the indispensable 
process by which the inherently abstract and raw content of principles originating 
from domestic law is disclosed and specified by the judiciary. Nor does it amount 
to modification, if various judicial organs interpret the same principle, within their 
margin of discretion, with negligible differences. Modification here denotes any 
alteration of the content of a general principle, which occurs after its reception 
into international law, and substantially transforms its nature in line with the 
intentions of states.
since general principles of law originate from domestic law, the question 
of modification must be examined in the realms of both international law and 
domestic law. we may draw a surprising conclusion at the very beginning of our 
investigation: general principles cannot be directly modified by international 
law-making, for it is incompatible with the peculiar way of their creation. these 
principles are automatically incorporated into international law by a customary rule 
of reception, if they are generally recognized and suitable to govern international 
relations. apart from the establishment of the continuously functioning rule of 
reception, no other legislative act has taken place in the international level. hence 
states could make an attempt to modify the content of a general principle by 
conventional or customary law-making only.42 still neither of these processes can 
Journal of International Law 7, no. 1 (1996): 29–41; l. wildhaber and s. Breitenmoser, 
‘the Relationship between customary international law and Municipal law in western 
european countries’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 48, 
no. 2 (1988): 163–207.
41 See, for example, Canada, Constitution Act 1982, Part I, Article 11, paragraph g); 
constitution of the democratic socialist Republic of sri lanka, 1978, article 13, paragraph 
6; hong kong Bill of Rights ordinance, 1991, Part ii, article 12, paragraph 2.
42 The question of modification has already been raised in the practice of the 
international court of Justice. the relevant separate opinion did not rule out that an 
international treaty may provide further rights in addition to those that spring from a general 
principle of law, but the interpretation of treaty stipulations led the judge to doubt that 
it had actually happened in the present case. despite that the wording leaves room for 
different interpretations, the structure of reasoning suggests that the granting of further 
rights would have taken place within the framework of the treaty, and would not have 
modified the principle itself: ‘That general principle of law concerning the rights or status 
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Rethinking International Law and Justice324
perform the expected adjustment. they would instead produce a new conventional 
or customary rule with a content different from the general principle concerned 
that, in turn, would remain unaltered and preserve its independent existence. the 
explanation is simple: different law-making processes necessarily yield different 
sources of law.43 given that the general principle would retain its original content 
and independence regardless of the modifying conventional or customary rule, a 
dual regime would emerge, in which potential conflicts would have to be resolved 
by rules of legal logic, such as lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior 
derogat legi priori. that is why conventional or customary rules cannot formally 
modify, only derogate from general principles that have become undesirable by 
reason of their contents.
General principles of law can be modified exclusively through the medium of 
domestic law. Remarkably, this process may be attributed not only to national, but 
also to international legal factors. however, in the latter case the conventional or 
customary rules of international law cannot and do not directly modify the general 
principles, as this possibility has just been ruled out – international law merely 
induces the modification of these principles through the medium of domestic law. 
in order to comprehend this process, we need to reach back to the relationship of 
international law and domestic law. it is commonly known that states incorporate 
the rules of international law into their national legal systems either by the 
monistic technique of adoption or the dualistic technique of transformation, and, at 
the same time, they must ensure harmony between international law and domestic 
law.44 naturally, the techniques of adoption and transformation too incorporate 
into domestic law the conventional or customary rules that have been created 
by states with a view to derogate from the content of a general principle of law. 
having been incorporated into domestic law, these conventional or customary 
rules may induce a change in the content of the domestic legal principle from 
which the general principle originates, in conformity with the requirement to 
ensure harmony between international law and domestic law. if this process 
of shareholders, which underlies not only italian company law but also the company law 
of some other civil law countries, may not be altered by any treaty aimed at the protection 
of investments unless that treaty contains some express provision to that end. […] yet there 
is no reason to interpret the [treaty] as having granted […] any further rights in addition 
to those to which the same shareholders would have been entitled under italian law as well 
as under the general principles of company law.’ Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United 
States of America v Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989, icJ Reports 1989, separate opinion 
of Judge oda, 86, 88–89. (insertion and emphasis added.)
43 With the establishment of the rule of reception, an automatic mechanism emerged 
in customary international law, the products of which – that is, the general principles of law 
– cannot be directly influenced or modified by other customary rules due to the differences 
of various law-making processes.
44 See, for example, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘Transformation or Adoption of 
international law into Municipal law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 12, 
no. 1 (1963): 88–124.
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uniformly takes place throughout the dominant legal systems of principal families 
of law, the customary rule of reception will elevate the domestic legal principle to 
the international level with its new content, and overwrite the general principle of 
law, from which states previously strove to derogate by conventional or customary 
law-making. (evidently, this process presupposes general international treaties or 
universal customary rules.)
domestic legal factors may change the content of a domestic legal principle, 
as well. if the new content becomes generally recognized and continuously allows 
the international application of the provision, the content of the corresponding 
general principle of law will automatically and accordingly change in international 
law by virtue of the rule of reception.45 normally, this is a subtle and lengthy 
evolution that can be perceived from a distance of decades or centuries only. 
Fast and radical changes, on the other hand, may also occur, and reveal an odd 
phenomenon. similarly to the conventional and customary rules of international 
law, general principles of law are incorporated by states into their national legal 
systems. these provisions travel an intriguing road: they depart from domestic 
law, gain reception into international law, then return to domestic law as rules of 
international law. hence selected principles exist in national legal systems in two 
forms: as general principles of law and as principles of domestic law. in spite of 
expectations to the contrary, a change of the latter does not immediately modify 
the former. It should not be forgotten that such modification takes place only if 
a change becomes generally recognized in the dominant legal systems of the 
principal families of law. in other words, a change in the content of a domestic 
legal principle is followed by a change of the corresponding general principle of 
law with a delay. until the general recognition of the new content of a domestic 
legal principle and the resulting modification of the general principle of law, the 
principle concerned exists in the national legal system not only in two forms, but 
also with two different contents. if a change is modest and tolerable, practical 
problems are unlikely. But in extreme cases, the requirement of harmony between 
international law and domestic law may slow or delay the modification of a 
domestic legal principle, and secure the preservation of the minimum standards of 
the rule of law.
the termination of general principles of law must also be examined in the 
realms of both international law and domestic law. yet it would be a grave mistake 
to automatically adopt the conclusions drawn with regard to modification to the 
question of termination, and to presume that the only feasible way of termination 
is through the medium of domestic law. the situation is quite different. in the 
international level, it is equally possible to terminate the entire category of general 
principles of law, and to terminate individual principles. the total elimination 
of general principles of law as a source of law requires the termination of the 
customary rule of reception, or the substantial modification of its purpose and 
45 Cf. Csiky, Az általános jogelvek, mint a nemzetközi jog forrása [General Principles 
of Law as a Source of International Law], 43.
Sampford Book 1.indb   325 9/24/2014   3:52:59 PM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Pr
oo
f C
op
y 
Rethinking International Law and Justice326
functioning. conversely and understandably, it is impossible to directly terminate 
individual principles by persistent objection46 or international law-making.47 there 
is but one scenario that involves the termination of a general principle on account 
of circumstances in the international level: if the provision is rendered unable to 
govern international relations by changes in the international environment. let 
there be no misunderstanding: it is not the mere fact of alteration of international 
relations that terminates the general principle, but the rule of reception that reacts 
to this alteration automatically, in absence of further measures by states. since 
international applicability is an essential condition of their recognition as a source 
of law, objectively inapplicable general principles cannot exist in the system of 
international law. if a general principle is no longer able to govern international 
relations due to changes in the international environment, and as such, one of the 
features required for its elevation to the international level fades away, then it will 
become invisible to the rule of reception, and ultimately disappear from international 
law. (theoretically speaking, nothing precludes the ‘revival’ of principles that have 
so been terminated by subsequent changes in the international environment.)
the termination of individual general principles can also be achieved through 
the medium of domestic law. all it takes to realize that is to breach the requirement 
of general recognition by removing the principle from a large number of national 
legal systems, or to widely modify its domestic legal content in a manner that it 
becomes unable to govern international relations in the future. such a generally 
unrecognized principle may nevertheless continue to exist in national legal systems, 
but it will remain invisible to the rule of reception and ineligible for elevation to 
the international level, for failing to meet the required conjunctive conditions.
It should be stressed that the question of modification or termination is mainly 
of academic importance. the practical probability of these measures is negligible. 
the overwhelming majority of general principles of law came into existence several 
centuries ago, and have become inseparable from the normal functioning of law. 
substantial alterations of any kind thus seem unnecessary and futile. Moreover, it 
is always far more convenient for states to derogate from an undesirable general 
46 In light that the customary rule of reception was established more than a century 
ago, a detailed examination of persistent objection may be dispensed with. Suffice it to 
note that persistent objection would have thwarted the elevation of general principles to 
the international level in toto (as such, it would have been ineffective against individual 
principles), and it would have had an effect on those states only that had rejected the rule of 
reception in the course of its formation. (on the recognition of general principles of law by 
newly independent states, see, s.P. sinha, ‘Perspective of the newly independent states on 
the Binding Quality of International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
14, no. 1 (1965): 124.)
47 Since states are not at all defenceless against the flow of principles towards 
international law, and have numerous ways to dispose of undesirable provisions, this 
statement is not irreconcilable with the postulation that international law does not bind 
sovereign states against their will. S.S. Lotus (France/Turkey), Judgment no. 9, 7 september 
1927, PciJ series a, no. 10, 18.
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principle by conventional or customary law-making. derogation, of course, would 
not bring about the modification or termination of the principle, but at least it 
offers a chance to evade its application with the help of rules of legal logic, such 
as lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior derogat legi priori.
Conclusion
in sum, it may be stated that general principles of law constitute an independent 
source of international law, created and maintained by a customary rule of reception. 
Due to their unwritten character, gap-filling function and insignificant influence 
on the everyday life of the international community, the existence, contents and 
effects of these principles mainly become palpable in the practice of international 
judicial organs. hence they are frequently described as being subsidiary or 
auxiliary in nature, though it should not be taken as if they actually occupied a 
subordinate or inferior position in the international legal order. in absence of a 
hierarchy between the various sources of international law, general principles of 
law are of equal rank with their more ‘robust’ counterparts, including international 
treaties and customary international law. For that reason, the catalogue contained 
in article 38, paragraph 1, of the statute of the international court of Justice 
reflects the logical train of thought of a judge in search of rules applicable to a 
particular case, not a hierarchy of sources.48 clearly, general principles of law may 
be labelled as a source of law in a formal sense only. in a material sense, the source 
of law is the community of states that established the customary rule of reception, 
or alternatively, the circumstances that necessitated this legislative act. general 
principles of law themselves can at best be deemed a material source of law in 
the context of the development of international law; even so, it is most doubtful 
whether rules are capable of serving as a means of laying down new rules.49 But 
it is exactly how this ethereal s urce of law attracts the attention of generations of 
international lawyers: every question answered leads to even more.
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